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Abstract: We treat the problem of privacy-preserving statistics verification in clinical
research. We show that given aggregated results from statistical calculations, we can
verify their correctness efficiently, without revealing any of the private inputs used for
the calculation. Our construction is based on the primitive of Secure Multi-Party Com-
putation from Shamir’s Secret Sharing. Basically, our setting involves three parties: a
hospital, which owns the private inputs, a clinical researcher, who lawfully processes
the sensitive data to produce an aggregated statistical result, and a third party (usually
several verifiers) assigned to verify this result for reliability and transparency reasons.
Our solution guarantees that these verifiers only learn about the aggregated results
(and what can be inferred from those about the underlying private data) and nothing
more. By taking advantage of the particular scenario at hand (where certain interme-
diate results, e.g., the mean over the dataset, are available in the clear) and utilizing
secret sharing primitives, our approach turns out to be practically efficient, which we
underpin by performing several experiments on real patient data. Our results show that
the privacy-preserving verification of the most commonly used statistical operations in
clinical research presents itself as an important use case, where the concept of secure
multi-party computation becomes employable in practice.
1 Introduction
Statistical analysis of experimental data is the cornerstone in many research areas. How-
ever, human error and fraud are common threats to the integrity of the statistical results
[Fan09, Ens, Mis, RBG+00]. In addition, verification of such statistical results cannot be
applied in a straight-forward manner, since in many cases the underlying data has to re-
main confidential. To address this problem, we propose a privacy-preserving verification
procedure that allows a number of semi-honest verifiers to ascertain that statistical calcu-
lations are consistent with the confidential data that they are supposedly based on, without
learning about this underlying confidential data.
In medical research, it is common practice to give clinical researchers access to raw patient
data. This is necessary for researchers to determine the appropriate statistical analysis
method for the specific dataset in question [Fie09, pp. 822]. Patient privacy in that context
is preserved by the researchers themselves, who are bound by confidentiality agreements.
Currently, only the most prestigious medical scientific journals like Thorax [Tho] perform
statistics verification on the clinical research results, prior to their publication. This is a
labor intensive task, which has to be performed by expert statisticians. In addition, there is
a trade-off between patient privacy and thoroughness of the verification procedure. On the
one hand, if the results are only partially checked, thoroughness is sacrificed to preserve
some privacy. On the other hand, if all the results are thoroughly checked, then patient
privacy will be completely compromised. Note that current anonymization techniques
have been shown insecure, since anonymized data can be de-anonymized [Swe02]. Thus,
disclosure of (possibly anonymized) patient information should not be allowed; not even
to medical journals for verification.
Although hospitals have the confidential patient data used for the statistical analysis avail-
able in the clear, they currently do not consider the verification of the statistics. This is
because 1) hospitals wish to avoid the additional workload brought by the verification; 2)
clinical researchers are usually employed by the same hospital that provides them with the
data, where a conflict of interests might arise; 3) on-site verification does not scale, since it
is not possible to verify the results accruing from datasets of different hospitals (i.e., in the
case of a multi-center clinical research). In contrast, medical journals are interested in the
correctness of the results that they publish. Therefore, we propose that journals outsource
the verification of statistics to an independent group of servers, called the verifiers, in a
privacy-preserving manner. In this setting, the architecture that we propose is depicted in
Fig. 1. Our approach can be fully automated and does not require additional manpower to
be employed. This may well serve as a motivation for all (medical) journals to implement
this paradigm and integrate verification into their pre-publication process.
Figure 1: Privacy-preserving architecture for the verification of clinical research
Concretely, we make the following contributions:
Enhance Privacy-Awareness in the Verification of Clinical Research. Patient data is
confidential and is only to be disclosed to (trusted) experts conducting the clinical research
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with the explicit patients’ informed consent. External parties, such as medical journals,
should not receive patient confidential information, even if it has been anonymized. We
point out this important issue and propose a best practice framework (Fig. 1).
Enable Privacy-Preserving Verification of Clinical Research. As the verification of
clinical research at the hospital site is unsuitable (for the mentioned reasons, such as con-
flict of interests), we propose a mechanism that allows for the outsourcing of this veri-
fication to several semi-honest verifiers without compromising the confidentiality of the
patients’ data. Our approach is based on secure multi-party computation from Shamir’s
secret sharing and is proven secure in the semi-honest model. We base our protocols on se-
cret sharing, because of the storage and computational efficiency it provides. For Shamir’s
secret sharing to be secure, while allowing the evaluation of polynomial functions over the
shares, we need at least three computing parties. Hence, we assume several (a minimum of
three) independent, non-colluding verifiers performing the verification task. The contrac-
tual relationship between the journal and the verifiers, prevents the verifiers from cheating.
Thus, our application scenario allows us to work in the semi-honest model, where the par-
ties are assumed to follow the protocol correctly, but they are able to record the protocol
transcript, in order to infer private information.
Demonstrate the Practicality of our Approach with Real Patient Data. We develop a
set of privacy-preserving algorithms, which allows the verification of the most commonly
used statistical operations in clinical research [Md09, OS08, ZBT07]: mean, variance,
Student’s t-test, Welch’s t-test, ANOVA (F -test), simple linear regression, chi-squared
test, Fisher’s exact test, and McNemar’s test. We test this representative set of algorithms
on a real medical dataset, produced in the context of a tele-treatment medical research
[AodJH10], and show their efficiency. The dataset consists of 2370 activity feedback
messages produced for 85 patients, participating in the research. We also doubled and
tripled this dataset to show the scalability of our solution.
The execution times of our verification algorithms on this dataset range from 43.5 ms in
the fastest case (a verification of the mean age of 84 patients) to 884.6 ms in the slowest
case (a verification of simple linear regression on 6828 messages). We refer to Section
5.2 for details. Our execution times, in combination with the fact that we use real data,
substantiates the practicality of our approach.
Our solution can detect any error in the computation of the statistics, but it cannot detect
logical errors (i.e., errors in the selection of the appropriate statistical model that fits the
data best). Thus, our solution is not meant to substitute, but rather to enhance the peer-
reviewing process of medical journals. Currently, the statistics that our solution can treat,
are limited to the ones meant for normally distributed data. Dealing with statistics meant
for not normally distributed data requires highly efficient ranking of the inputs, which is a
challenging task in the secret shared domain. We leave it as an interesting future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss related work and
frame our contribution within it. In Section 3, we give the preliminaries on the secret shar-
ing and the multi-party computation techniques that we utilize. In Section 4, we discuss
the proposed verification algorithms and the statistics to be verified. Section 5 deals with
the security and performance analysis of our algorithms and Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Related Work
A lot of work has been done to solve the problem of privacy-preserving statistical analy-
sis [DA01, DHC04, SCD+08, DN04, HR10, DF97, KLSR09]. In this setting, aggregated
statistical results are being computed among several parties, while the inputs for the calcu-
lation of these results remain private. In contrast to our work, their attention is focused on
secure computation of certain statistics, where each party that is involved in the computa-
tion provides its own private data. We deal with the verification of statistics, for which the
verifiers do not contribute their own private data. In that context, privacy concerns data
provided by a party, which is not involved in the computation.
Another related topic in our setting is verifiable computation [GGP10, PRV12, AIK10,
BGV11, PST13]. Verifiable computation allows a party (or set of parties) to outsource the
computation of certain functions to untrusted external parties, while maintaining verifiable
results. However, despite their lack of efficiency, all existing constructions in this area are
not applicable in our setting, as the verification is not meant to be privacy-preserving. The
security definitions of these works guarantee that the untrusted computing parties cannot
cheat in the computation (i.e., a false result will not pass the verification procedure).
Another recently emerged approach towards addressing the problem of privacy-preserving
verification is computing on authenticated data [ABC+12], which can be accomplished
using homomorphic signatures. The concept of homomorphic signatures emerged from
[JMSW02], where the first example application scenarios and definitions were given. Re-
cently, the application of homomorphic signatures was extended from treating only set
operations, to computation of functions on the signed data [BF11b, BF11a]. In [BF11b],
Boneh and Freeman propose a homomorphic signature scheme that allows linear func-
tions to be performed on the signed data, while anyone can produce a signature on the
result of the function. The scheme is weakly context hiding, meaning that it protects the
privacy of the signed data, but not hiding the fact that the function was executed. Although
the aforementioned requirement fits well in our scenario, the scheme can only treat linear
functions, which is insufficient for our purposes, as we need to compute additions and
multiplications with non-constants. Building upon their previous work [BF11b], Boneh
and Freeman [BF11a] propose a homomorphic signature scheme for polynomial func-
tions. However, the enhanced functionality of the latter scheme [BF11a] comes at the cost
of completely loosing the property of context hiding. This makes it inadequate for our
scenario, as it provides no privacy of the underlying inputs at all.
Finally, Thompson et al.’s work [THH+09] deals with computing and verifying aggregate
queries on (private) outsourced databases. They look at a setting, where a data owner
outsources his private database to third-party service providers, who can later answer ag-
gregate queries of external users or the data owner himself. Although their work is based
on similar building blocks as ours, their setting is slightly different as it focuses on the
computation of a very limited class of statistics and not on their verification. Exploiting
the fact that we only perform verification (instead of computation from scratch) allows us
to achieve very high efficiency compared to their work, while being able to deal with more
sophisticated statistics at the same time.
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The efficiency and hence practicality of Multi-Party Computation has received a lot of
attention in the last few years [BCD+09, BSMD10, BLW08]. Our solution, similarly to
the work of Bogetoft et al. [BCD+09] is based on VIFF [VD], which we used to implement
the proposed privacy-preserving verification algorithms.
3 Preliminaries
We recall Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] and Secure Multi-Party Computation [GRR98],
which form the main building blocks of our protocols.
3.1 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme is a protocol, where a special party called the dealer, wishes to
share a secret value s ∈ Fq (i.e., a secret value in a finite field of order q), among the set
of protocol participants. A subset of the protocol participants, called the qualified set, can
reconstruct the original secret value. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Sha79] consists of
three subprotocols: the share generation, secret sharing and secret reconstruction. During
the share generation, the dealer of the protocol chooses a random polynomial (over some
finite field Fq) p(x) = αtx
τ+...+α1x+s of degree τ , where τ+1 is the number of players
in the qualified set and s is the secret to be shared. Then, he evaluates the polynomial for
each player as follows: [s]i := p(i), where [s]i denotes the share of s of the i
th player Pi.
For secret sharing all the shares have to be distributed to the players via secure channels.
Then, to reconstruct the secret, anyone who possesses at least τ + 1 shares can interpolate
the polynomial (e.g., by Lagrange interpolation) and reconstruct the original secret s.
3.2 Secure Multi-Party Computation based on Secret Sharing
Due to the additively homomorphic property of Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, addition
and subtraction of Shamir’s shares can be performed directly on the shares (locally by each
player), without requiring any interaction. This means that after having added/subtracted
the shares, we can reconstruct the resulting secret, and the result of the reconstruction will
be the correct result of the summation/subtraction. The same holds for addition, subtrac-
tion and multiplication with public constants on Shamir’s shares. Computing the sum of
the shares of a secret vector’s elements and then opening this result is commonly used
for the construction of our privacy-preserving verification algorithms; we will denote the
protocol for the aforementioned computation SumPub(.). The input for this protocol is
the shares of a secret shared vector of integer values, and the output is the result of the
addition of the vector elements (in the clear).
To multiply with shares, we need an interactive protocol to be executed among the play-
ers. In [GRR98], an interactive protocol for multiplication of Shamir’s shares is proposed,
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which completes its execution in one communication round. This protocol reduces the de-
gree of the underlying polynomial (which has been doubled due to the multiplication) and
restores its randomness, requiring one interactive operation for both. Our verification al-
gorithms heavily depend on the computation of inner products in the secret shared domain.
For the computation of inner products, we use a generalized version of the multiplication
protocol [GRR98], also discussed in [CHd10], that comes at the same round communi-
cation cost as the multiplication (i.e., one communication round). This protocol (called
InnerPub(.)) performs all the necessary operations in the secret shared domain and then
reconstructs the result of the inner product. This is done by first using the PRZS(.) pro-
tocol (Pseudorandom Zero-Sharing), proposed in [CDI05], to distribute the shares of a 0
to the protocol participants; those shares are later added to the share of the multiplication
result, to restore its randomness. The summation of the products and the reconstruction
of the result together, require only one communication round, in which the shares are dis-
tributed, the summation is computed and the result is reconstructed. The input for the
InnerPub(.) protocol is the shares of two secret shared vectors of integer values, and the
output is the result of computing the inner product on these vectors (in the clear).
4 Privacy-Preserving Statistics Verification
In this section, we describe our protocols for privacy-preserving verification of statistics,
while dealing with each statistical test separately. Prior to the execution of each pro-
tocol, we assume that the original data used in the calculation has been properly secret
shared among the verifiers (by the hospital), according to Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme
[Sha79]. The main ingredients for our verification protocols, which act in the secret shared
domain, are the InnerPub(.) and SumPub(.) protocols discussed in the Preliminaries.
Our approach takes advantage of the fact that all statistical results to be verified are public.
Thus, we can let the verifiers recompute the statistics in the secret shared domain, recon-
struct the shared results, and compare with the statistics to be verified in the clear. In most
cases, we can also take advantage of intermediate results, since they are public. Note that
although our building blocks work on integers, we can also handle fixed point numbers,
by scaling them up to the desired precision and then treat them as integers.
4.1 Privacy-Preserving Mean Verification
The mean (or average) is one of the simplest statistics and is computed as
x¯ =
∑N
i=1 xi
N
, (1)
where N is the size of the sample (i.e., the number of individual subjects to be analyzed)
and xi is the variable concerning the i
th subject.
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Recall that we assume that all xi (i = 1, .., N ) have been secret shared among the veri-
fiers. We compute the value x¯ in a privacy-preserving manner, by letting the verifiers run
SumPub(.). This yields the result
∑N
i=1 xi. The opening of this result does not constitute
a privacy violation, since both the mean value to be verified and the size of the sample are
public values, and the result of the summation can be computed by those two values.
By taking advantage of the fact that the number of subjects N is public, we do not perform
the division by N in the secret shared domain. Instead, we multiply the mean value (that
is to be verified) by N and compare it with the sum
∑N
i=1 xi that the verifiers computed
(for efficiency reasons). The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 1 (Appendix A).
4.2 Privacy-Preserving Variance Verification
The variance is a measure, assessing how far the real observations are from the expected
value (i.e., the mean value discussed in the previous subsection) and is computed as
S2 =
∑N
i=1(xi − x¯)
2
N − 1
. (2)
The variance only makes sense if published together with the mean value. Thus, the mean
value corresponding to the variance will also be public. Our variance verification algo-
rithm first verifies the aforementioned mean value, since it cannot be safely used, unless
verified. Next, the verifiers compute all the N subtractions locally on the shares of xi
and then interactively compute an inner product (with public result) on the results of these
subtractions. This is performed by invoking the InnerPub(.) protocol, discussed earlier.
Similarly to the mean verification protocol, we avoid the division by N − 1 in the secret
shared domain and perform a multiplication of the received variance (to be verified) by
N − 1, instead. Then, the verifiers check the consistency of the latter product, with the
inner product computed earlier and if any of them fails to find a match, the verification
fails. Details are given in Algorithm 2 (Appendix A).
4.3 Privacy-Preserving Student’s t-test Verification
The Student’s t-test is one of the most frequently used statistical tests to assess the signifi-
cance of a statistical hypothesis and is calculated as
tstudent =
∑
xi
N
−
∑
yi
N√
∑
(xi−x¯)
2
N−1 +
∑
(yi−y¯)
2
N−1
N
=
x¯− y¯√
S2x+S
2
y
N
, (3)
where S2x (resp. S
2
y ) is the variance of variable x (resp. y).
The Student’s t-test depends on: the variables (x and y) on which it is computed, which we
treat as the private inputs that are secret shared among the verifiers; the mean and variances
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corresponding to those variables; and the number of subjects N . In the context of clinical
research, the variables x and y can be blood pressures of N patients, after being treated
with medication X and Y respectively, and the hypothesis could concern the effectiveness
of these two medications in reducing the blood pressure. As we will use the public means
and variances for the verification of the t-value, we first need to verify them. After having
verified the public mean values and the corresponding variances, the verifiers act only in
the plaintext domain to evaluate equation (3), and check the consistency of this result with
the one received for verification. For further details see Algorithm 3 (Appendix A).
4.4 Privacy-Preserving Welch’s t-test Verification
The Welch’s t-test is a variation of the Student’s t-test, for the cases where the two groups
x, y under consideration, have different variances and sizes. The formula for calculating
Welch’s t-test is given by
twelch =
x¯− y¯√
S2x
Nx
+
S2y
Ny
, (4)
where Nx (resp. Ny) is the size of group x (resp. y).
After having verified the mean values and the corresponding variances, there is no other
calculation or verification to be performed in the secret shared domain. Having verified
the means and variances for equation (4), and given that Nx, Ny are public, the verifiers
evaluate equation (4). To complete the verification, the verifiers compare the result of the
aforementioned privacy-preserving evaluation with the t-value to be verified. The details
of the verification algorithm for Welch’s t-test are given in Algorithm 4 (Appendix A).
4.5 Privacy-Preserving F -test Verification
The F -test is one of the most commonly used tests as part of the Analysis Of Variance
(ANOVA). ANOVA is used to determine the significance of a statistical hypothesis. It is
used instead of a t-test when there are more than two groups for which the significance of
the difference among them needs to be determined. We can compute the F -value as
F = (
K∑
i=1
Ni(x¯i − X¯)
2
K − 1
)/(
K,Ni∑
i=1,j=1
(xij − x¯i)
2
G−K
), (5)
where K is the number of groups under analysis, Ni is the size of the i
th group, x¯i is the
mean of the ith group, X¯ is the mean of all group means, xij is the j
th (private) value of
group i, and G is the total size (i.e., the sum of all Ni). The privacy-preserving variant
of this, works as follows: the verifiers compute and verify the means and variances of all
groups. Then, they compute in the clear the overall mean X¯ and the total size G. Given
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the aforementioned intermediate results, the verifiers evaluate equation (5) and compare
the result to the F -value to be verified. The detailed protocol is listed in Algorithm 5.
4.6 Privacy-Preserving Simple Linear Regression Verification
Simple linear regression is used to predict an outcome (or dependent) variable from one
predictor (or explanatory) variable. Specifically for simple linear regression, what needs
to be calculated is the coefficients of the straight line
y = αx+ β (6)
where the coefficient β is given as β =
∑N
i=1(xi−x¯)(yi−y¯)∑
N
i=1(xi−x¯)
2 , and α is given as α = y¯ − βx¯.
The main ingredients for the calculation of β are the mean values of each of the two groups.
Thus, the verifiers begin with verifying the means. Observe also that the denominator of
the fraction is the sum of squared errors, which can be computed by invoking the Inner-
Pub(.) protocol with the appropriate arguments (as seen before in the verification of the
variance). The numerator of the fraction is also an inner product that the verifiers com-
pute. The result of this inner product is allowed to be revealed to the verifiers, because the
coefficient β is part of the public result of linear regression and this value can be directly
determined by multiplying β with the sum of squared errors over variable x, which is also
public (as part of the variance). Having calculated all the aforementioned, the verifiers
compute β and compare it with the received one. Next, they calculate α and proceed to
its comparison with the α received for verification. After those two comparisons, the pa-
rameters of the straight line, accruing from the simple linear regression have been verified.
Our detailed protocol for this test is listed in Algorithm 6 (Appendix A).
4.7 Privacy-Preserving Chi-Squared test Verification
The Chi-squared test [Pea00] and the two tests that follow in the next subsections, namely
Fisher’s exact test [Fis22] and McNemar’s test [McN47], are all statistical tests meant
to be used when the underlying data is categorical. This means that those tests examine
the frequency distributions of observations in a group. The frequencies observedij are
recorded in a table, called the contingency table, where the row and column totals (i.e., the
sum of each row’s elements RowTotali and column’s elements ColumnTotalj , respec-
tively) are also recorded. The most well-known chi-squared test (and the one that we treat
in this paper) is Pearson’s χ2-test [Pea00]. In particular, this test measures how well the
experimental data fits in the chi-squared distribution. The formula for Pearson’s χ2-test is
χ2 =
∑ (observedij −modelij)2
modelij
, (7)
where modelij = (RowTotali · ColumnTotalj)/N .
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To enable privacy-preserving verification of tests meant for categorical data, a preprocess-
ing step is required. During the preprocessing phase, the raw data is encoded to its unary
representation. The number of categories, in each dimension of the clinical research, de-
fines the number of bits of each entry in the table of raw data. For example, if we were
examining the effect of 3 different medications, the number of bits of each entry in the
medication column would have been also 3. After having successfully preprocessed the
data, the hospital secret shares this data bitwise among the verifiers. We require this pre-
processing step, as it allows us to efficiently compute the frequencies in the contingency
table, by only adding up the data, or computing their inner product column-wise.
For the verification of the χ2-test, we need to verify the frequencies of the variables in a
contingency table. This is common to all statistical tests meant for categorical data and we
present this step in a separate algorithm (VrfContingency(.), Algorithm 7 in Appendix A),
for reusability purposes. The contingency table verification is performed by calculating the
inner product of each bitwise secret shared variable’s column, with the second variable’s
corresponding column. This is what the verifiers compute in the secret shared domain
and then check its consistency with the table received for verification. The total and the
marginal totals do not require calculations in the secret shared domain to get verified, since
they can be computed by adding up the (verified) frequencies. Having computed the total
and marginal totals, and verified the frequencies in the contingency table, the verifiers
evaluate equation (7) and compare the result to the value to be verified. Our detailed
algorithm for privacy-preserving χ2-test verification is given in Algorithm 8 (Appendix A).
4.8 Privacy-Preserving Fisher’s exact test Verification
Fisher’s exact test [Fis22] gives us the exact p-value determining whether the relationship
between the variables of the model is significant. This is in contrast to the χ2-test, which is
an approximation of the significance. Fisher’s exact test is used with small sample groups,
while χ2-test is more suitable for large ones. The formula for Fisher’s exact test is
p =
∏
(RowTotali! · ColumnTotalj !)∏
observedij ! ·N !
. (8)
Fisher’s exact test is similar to the χ2-test in terms of verification. This is because all that
needs to be verified is the frequencies in the contingency table. The same preprocessing
on the original data, as the one performed for the χ2-test is required. The verifiers begin
with the verification of the frequencies in the contingency table, and the computation of
the total and the marginal totals (same as in χ2-test). Then, they evaluate equation (8) and
check the consistency of the result with the one to be verified. Our detailed algorithm for
Fisher’s exact test verification is given in Algorithm 9 (Appendix A).
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4.9 Privacy-Preserving McNemar’s test Verification
McNemar’s test [McN47], similarly to Pearson’s χ2-test, gives us an approximation of the
significance. This test, given by the following formula
χ2 =
(observed1,2 − observed2,1)
2
observed1,2 + observed2,1
, (9)
can be only applied to data recorded on a 2 × 2 contingency table. For McNemar’s test,
what we verify in the secret shared domain is the frequencies of the contingency table, as
in Fisher’s exact test and χ2-test. Hence, the verifiers proceed as described in χ2-test’s
verification. Then, they evaluate equation (9) and compare the result with the χ2-value
received for verification. Details are given in Algorithm 10 (Appendix A).
5 Security and Performance Analysis
Our setting lies in the semi-honest model, meaning that the verifiers are assumed to hon-
estly follow the instructions mandated by the protocol, but they wish to learn as much
information as possible about the private inputs of the dealer (i.e., the hospital). The ver-
ifiers are allowed to know all the public inputs given as arguments in the protocols (e.g.,
the sample group size N of the statistical operation to be verified) and all the public results
that they compute. The verifiers are not allowed to learn anything more than the aforemen-
tioned, in addition to what can be inferred by the results. Hence, we need to protect the
private inputs of the dealer and we do so by means of Shamir’s Secret Sharing. This way
we achieve information-theoretic security, as long as at least τ > n2 verifiers are honest
and do not collude. We assume that there exists pairwise secure channels between the
verifiers.
Our performance analysis is based on a proof of concept implementation that we designed
to demonstrate the efficiency of our solution. We used real patient data for our experiments
to show the applicability of our proposal in practical cases. The aforementioned data con-
cerns patient compliance in a tele-treatment application, where the patients were carrying
a monitoring system, measuring their activity and sending them back activity advice, in
the form of feedback messages. This dataset consists of 2370 feedback messages of 85 pa-
tients that have been analyzed. For more information about the data and the tele-treatment
application we refer the reader to [AodJH10].
5.1 Security Analysis
The security requirement that we wish to satisfy is to preserve the confidentiality of the
private inputs of the dealer, while allowing a certain functionality of the verifiers, enabling
the verification of the result of a predefined function. We deal with passive, static adver-
saries corrupting any minority of the verifiers. Security is modeled using the real vs. ideal
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paradigm [Gol04, Section 7.2]. In the real world, the protocol participants execute the
protocol interactively and there is an adversary A, having access to all the private inputs
and all the messages exchanged among the corrupted parties, as well as the public inputs
of both the corrupted and the honest parties. In the ideal world, a protocol is assumed
to be executed in the presence of a trusted party, which the protocol participants query
and get the appropriate results, based on their predefined functionality. To prove security
in the real vs. ideal framework, we show that all adversarial behavior in the real world
(where there is no trusted party) can be simulated in the ideal world. In the following, we
sketch the construction of such a simulator S , while we treat the security of each building
block (i.e., subroutine) of our construction separately and the overall security follows by
the Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model [Gol04, Theorem 7.3.3].
Observe that in all our algorithms there are only two building blocks that act in the se-
cret shared domain, the SumPub(.) and the InnerPub(.) algorithms. The rest of the
computations are performed in the clear. The SumPub(.) algorithm is executed in one
communication round. All the messages exchanged in this round are public inputs of the
parties (independent of their private inputs). Thus, the views of the adversary and the
simulator are exactly the same (i.e., indistinguishable) meaning that SumPub(.) is secure.
The InnerPub(.) algorithm starts with n invocations of the PRZS(.) function, where n
is the number of items in each vector. This function was proposed and proven secure in
[CDI05]. Next, (in the ideal world) the trusted party computes a share of the inner product
per party, and adds to this, his share of a secret shared 0 value ([0]), which he obtained
from the invocation of the PRZS(.) function. The adversary (in the real world) proceeds
similarly, but computes the resulting share for each honest party on random shares (more
precisely on shares of uniformly randomly integers), because it has no access to their pri-
vate inputs. The addition of the secret shared 0 value at this step, restores the uniformly
randomness of the shares. Thus, the ”fresh” shares do not depend on the private inputs
anymore. The aforementioned shares form the public inputs of the parties, which are
accessible by both the adversary and the simulator. The indistinguishability of the adver-
sary’s (real-world) view from the simulator’s (ideal-world) view follows from the fact that
the adversary and simulator have identical views of the public inputs and indistinguishable
views of the private inputs. The latter holds, because Shamir’s shares are perfectly indis-
tinguishable from random integers. Hence, the InnerPub(.) algorithm is proven secure.
Having proven secure the SumPub(.) and the InnerPub(.) algorithms, by the composi-
tion theorem, the overall security of our protocols is guaranteed.
5.2 Performance Analysis
Our performance analysis presents the execution times of our verification algorithms. The
implementation of these algorithms is based on VIFF [VD]. The experiments for timing
our verification algorithms were conducted on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i3-2350M processor,
at 2.3 GHz, with 4.00 GB RAM and Windows 7 64-bit operating system. We have con-
ducted all tests on localhost, with 3 verifiers, and the network latency has not been taken
into account. In VIFF, the prime p, determining the size of the field Zp, is selected to be
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greater than (2l+1+2l+k+1), where l is the maximum bit length of the inputs, and k is the
statistical security parameter. These values are by default set to l = 32 and k = 30. For
reasons of uniformity of the execution time results we use these default values for all our
experiments. To handle fixed point numbers occurring in our setting, we scale them up to
a precision of five decimal digits and then treat them as integers. The selection of l = 32
bits is large enough to handle this scaling both for our inputs and for our outputs.
In addition to the computational cost, determined by the number of variables, the number
of entries per variable and the size p (of∼ 64 bits) of the field Zp, the communication cost
also plays an important role in the overall performance. Recall that in our algorithms, the
communication cost is brought only by the invocations of SumPub(.) and InnerPub(.),
which are the only building blocks acting in the secret shared domain. The communication
cost of each such invocation remains constant in all our algorithms, as for both subroutines
only one aggregated value is sent, the size of which is upper bounded by the size of the field
Zp, which is also constant and equal to 8 bytes (corresponding to the 64 bits of the prime p)
per invocation, per verifier. Hence, our communication cost solely depends on the number
of interactive rounds (i.e., the number of SumPub(.) and InnerPub(.) invocations). In
the following, we deal with the round complexity of each statistic separately.
Mean and Variance: For the verification of the mean and variance we calculated those
two statistics on the ages of 84 patients. One patient (out of the originally 85 patients)
was excluded from the specific tests, because his age value was missing. The variable that
influences the runtime is the number of patientsN = 84 and the number of communication
rounds is 1 and 2, for the mean and variance, respectively. The performance results of the
Mean and Variance verification algorithms are presented in Table 1. These two tests do
not scale perfectly linearly, due to their very small execution times.
Mean Variance
84 patients 43.5 ms 43.7 ms
168 patients 45.1 ms 49.7 ms
252 patients 45.8 ms 49.9 ms
Table 1: Performance of Mean and Variance Verification
ANOVA, Simple Linear Regression, Student’s and Welch’s t-tests: We conducted
Welch’s t-test on the time elapsed between receiving a message and reading it, versus
patient compliance to that message. We have split our dataset of 2370 messages based on
whether the patient complied to the message (N1 = 1404) or not (N2 = 966). Welch’s
t-test in this case, identifies whether there is a significant relationship between the com-
pliance to a feedback message and the time elapsed between receiving it and reading it.
It completes its execution in 4 rounds. For ANOVA we used the same time variable, ver-
sus the diagnosis (categorical variable taking 4 distinct diagnosis values) for the patient
reading the feedback message in question. The dataset of 2370 messages is split based on
the 4 different diagnoses to N1 = 953, N2 = 524, N3 = 365, N4 = 528 and requires 8
communication rounds. For simple linear regression, we examine the significance of the
relationship between the aforementioned time variable (dependent variable), and the age
of each patient (independent variable). We have excluded from our dataset the messages
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concerning a patient for whom the age value was missing, and the size of our sample is
N = 2276, while the number of required communication rounds is 4.
Our dataset does not contain two equal sized groups on which we can perform Student’s
t-test. Thus, we have excluded these runtimes from our performance results. Given the
similarity of these two tests, their corresponding runtimes for the verification algorithms
are also expected to be similar. Our performance results for Welch’s t-test and F -test are
summarized in Table 2; for regression they are given in Table 3. These tests scale linearly
in the number of inputs (see Tables 2 and 3), as we have shown by doubling and tripling
our dataset, and executing the algorithms on the augmented datasets.
Welch’s t-test F -test
2370 msgs 165.5 ms 171.6 ms
4740 msgs 291.9 ms 315.1 ms
7110 msgs 404.1 ms 479.0 ms
Table 2: Performance of Welch’s t-test
and F -test Verification
Regression
2276 msgs 304.3 ms
4552 msgs 586.4 ms
6828 msgs 884.6 ms
Table 3: Performance of Simple
Linear Regression Verification
Chi-Squared test, Fisher’s exact test and McNemar’s test: We performed χ2-test on
the compliance to each of the 2370 feedback messages versus the diagnosis, to determine
whether the data follows the χ2 distribution. For Fisher’s exact test, we split our dataset
based on the gender of the 85 patients versus the diagnosis. We also performed and verified
McNemar’s test on the compliance to each of the 2370 feedback messages versus the feed-
back type (i.e., encouraging or discouraging message). Both the χ2-test and Fisher’s exact
test verification require 8 communication rounds each, while McNemar’s test requires 4
rounds. The performance results for χ2-test and McNemar’s test verification algorithms
are given in Table 4, while the corresponding results for Fisher’s test are presented in Ta-
ble 5. As expected from our experimental setup, the execution time of the verification
algorithms scales linearly in the number of input data.
Chi-Squared McNemar’s
2370 msgs 207.3 ms 138.8 ms
4740 msgs 397.7 ms 238.8 ms
7110 msgs 594.4 ms 352.7 ms
Table 4: Performance of Chi-Squared
and McNemar’s test Verification
Fisher’s test
85 patients 53.3 ms
170 patients 57.7 ms
255 patients 70.3 ms
Table 5: Performance of Fisher’s
exact test Verification
6 Conclusion
We deal with privacy-preserving verification of statistics in clinical research, where the
prover does not wish to disclose information about the inputs to the verifier. This is recip-
rocal to scenarios that previous works address, where the verifier does not wish to disclose
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information about the inputs to the prover. We demonstrate that in the clinical research sce-
nario under consideration, privacy-preserving verification of statistics can be performed so
efficiently, that it can be applied in practice.
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A Verification Algorithms
Algorithm 1 v ← VrfMean([x], N, x¯)
1: Input: [x] = secret shared vector x, N = size of sample group, x¯ = calculated mean
value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: for all Pj do
4: if (N · x¯) v= SumPub([x]) then
5: return 0
6: return 1
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Algorithm 2 v ← VrfVariance([x], x¯, N, S2)
1: Input: [x] = secret shared vector x, x¯ = mean value of sample group x, N = size of
sample group, S2 = calculated variance to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfMean([x], N, x¯) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: if ((N − 1) · S2) v= InnerPub(([x]− x¯), ([x]− x¯)) then
7: return 0
8: return 1
Algorithm 3 v ← VrfS-T-test([x], [y], x¯, y¯, N, S2x, S
2
y , t)
1: Input: [x] = secret shared vector x, [y] = secret shared vector y, x¯ = mean value of
sample group x, y¯ = mean value of sample group y, N = size of sample group, S2x
= variance of sample group x, S2y = variance of sample group y, t = t-value to be
verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfVariance([x], x¯, N, S2x) == 0 or VrfVariance([y], y¯, N, S
2
y) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: if (x¯− y¯)/(
√
S2x+S
2
y
N
) v= t then
7: return 0
8: return 1
Algorithm 4 v ← VrfW-T-test([x], [y], x¯, y¯, Nx, Ny, S
2
x, S
2
y , t)
1: Input: [x] = secret shared vector x, [y] = secret shared vector y, x¯ = mean value of
sample group x, y¯ = mean value of sample group y, Nx = size of sample group x, Ny
= size of sample group y, S2x = variance of sample group x, S
2
y = variance of sample
group y, t = t-value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfVariance([x], x¯, Nx, S
2
x) == 0 or VrfVariance([y], y¯, Ny, S
2
y) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: if (x¯− y¯)/(
√
S2x
Nx
+
S2y
Ny
) v= t then
7: return 0
8: return 1
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Algorithm 5 v ← VrfF-test(K, [x][K], x¯[K], N [K], S2[K], F )
1: Input: K = number of groups, [x] = table of K secret shared vectors x[K], x¯[K] =
mean values of K sample groups x, N [K] = K sizes of the sample groups, S2[K] =
variances of the K sample groups, F = F -value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: for k = 1, ...,K do
4: if VrfVariance([x]k, x¯k, Nk, S
2
k) == 0 then
5: return 0
6: for all Pj do
7: if (
∑K
k=1
Nk(x¯k−
∑K
k=1 x¯k
K
)2
K−1 )/(
∑K
k=1
([x]k−x¯k)2∑
K
k=1Nk−K
) v= F then
8: return 0
9: return 1
Algorithm 6 v ← VrfSimpleLinearRegression([x], [y], x¯, y¯, α, β,N)
1: Input: [x] = secret shared vector x, [y] = secret shared vector y, x¯ = mean value
of sample group x, y¯ = mean value of sample group y, α = α-value to be verified,
β = β-value to be verified, N = size of sample group
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfMean([x], N, x¯) == 0 or VrfMean([y], N, y¯) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: if
InnerPub(([x]−x¯),([y]−y¯))
InnerPub(([x]−x¯),([x]−x¯))
v= β or (y¯ − β · x¯) v= α then
7: return 0
8: return 1
Algorithm 7 v ← VrfContingency([x[C1]], [y[C2]], C1, C2, F [C1, C2])
1: Input: [x] = C1 · N secret shared bits of the unary representation of vector x, [y]
= C1 · N secret shared bits of the unary representation of vector y, C1 = number
of possible values under ”cause” of the experiment, C2 = number of possible values
under ”effect” of the experiment, F [C1, C2] = table of size C1 · C2 containing the
frequencies observed (i.e., inner part of the contingency table)
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: for k = 1, ..., C1 do
4: for l = 1, ..., C2 do
5: V F [k, l]← InnerPub([xk], [yl])
6: for all Pj do
7: if V F [k, l] v= F [k, l] then
8: return 0
9: return 1
Privacy-Preserving Verification of Clinical Research 499
Algorithm 8 v ← VrfChi-squaredTest([x[C1]], [y[C2]], C1, C2, F [C1, C2], χ2)
1: Input: [x] (resp. [y]) = bitwise secret shared vector x (resp. y), where each entry has
C1 (resp. C2) bits, C1 = number of possible values under ”cause” of the experiment,
C2 = number of possible values under ”effect” of the experiment, F [C1, C2] = table
of size C1 · C2 containing the frequencies observed, χ2 = χ2-value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfContingency([x[C1]], [y[C2]], C1, C2, F [C1, C2]) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: modelk,l ← (
∑C2,C1
l=1,k=1 Fk,l ·
∑C1,C2
k=1,l=1 Fk,l)/(
∑C1
k=1RowTotalk)
7: if
∑C1,C2
k=1,l=1
(Fk,l−modelk,l)
2
modelk,l
v= χ2 then
8: return 0
9: return 1
Algorithm 9 v ← VrfFisher’sTest([x[C1]], [y[C2]], C1, C2, F [C1, C2], p)
1: Input: [x] (resp. [y]) = bitwise secret shared vector x (resp. y), where each entry has
C1 (resp. C2) bits, C1 = number of possible values under ”cause” of the experiment,
C2 = number of possible values under ”effect” of the experiment, F [C1, C2] = table
of size C1 · C2 containing the frequencies observed, p = p-value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfContingency([x[C1]], [y[C2]], C1, C2, F [C1, C2]) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: V pUpper ←
∏C1
k=1
∑C2,C1
l=1,k=1 Fk,l! ·
∏C2
l=1
∑C1,C2
k=1,l=1 Fk,l! #numerator of the p fraction
7: V pLower ←
∏C1,C2
k=1,l=1 Fk,l! ·
∑C1
k=1
∑C2,C1
l=1,k=1 Fk,l! #denominator of the p fraction
8: if V pUpper
V pLower
v= p then
9: return 0
10: return 1
Algorithm 10 v ← VrfMcNemar’sTest([x[2]], [y[2]], F [2, 2], χ2)
1: Input: [x] (resp. [y]) = bitwise secret shared vector x (resp. y), where each entry has
2 bits, F [2, 2] = 2× 2 table of frequencies, χ2 = χ2-value to be verified
2: Output: v = 0 or 1; 0 → unsuccessful verification, 1 → successful verification
3: if VrfContingency([x[2]], [y[2]], 2, 2, F [2, 2]) == 0 then
4: return 0
5: for all Pj do
6: if
(F1,2−F2,1)
2
F1,2+F2,1
v= χ2 then
7: return 0
8: return 1
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